Bellum Battle Comparator
Compare two engagements without flattening incompatible historical numbers. Bellum contrasts outcome, terrain, tactical sequence, command decisions, documented formations, primary-source depth and evidence quality while keeping each source definition intact.
June 28, 1776 · South Carolina
Sullivan’s Island on June 28, 1776 was an artillery and naval-positioning battle. William Moultrie’s unfinished palmetto fort absorbed a punishment that British planners expected to be decisive, while shoals and weak army-navy coordination frustrated the larger attack on Charleston.
May 10, 1775 · New York
The May 10, 1775 capture of Fort Ticonderoga was a small action with disproportionate strategic value. The rebels gained a key northern post, material, and a foothold on the route toward Canada, while the fort’s artillery later became part of the Boston siege story.
| Dimension | Battle of Sullivan’s Island | Capture of Fort Ticonderoga |
|---|---|---|
| Result | American victory | American victory |
| Tactical outcome | Royal Navy ships bombarded an unfinished palmetto-and-sand fort for roughly nine hours but failed to reduce it; attempts to maneuver additional ships and coordinate with land forces did not break the American defense. | A small rebel force associated with Ethan Allen, Benedict Arnold and the Green Mountain Boys surprised the lightly held British post and took Fort Ticonderoga with little fighting. |
| Strategic effect | The victory protected Charleston during a critical early phase of the war, damaged British expectations for an easy southern restoration, and delayed a successful British capture of the city until 1780. | The capture opened a strategically important Lake Champlain position to the revolutionaries and gave them access to artillery and stores; guns from the northern forts later contributed to the artillery concentration around Boston. |
| Terrain problem | The fort stood on a low island amid channels, shoals and tidal water. Naval maneuver mattered as much as the parapet: ships that tried to gain enfilading positions risked grounding on unfamiliar or difficult shoals. | Ticonderoga sat at a narrows controlling movement between Lake George and Lake Champlain. The strategic value of the site was far larger than the number of troops inside the fort on May 10. |
| Intelligence problem | British planning underestimated both the resistance of palmetto-and-sand construction and the practical difficulties of combining naval bombardment with an army approach across local channels. | The attackers exploited surprise and local knowledge. The British garrison did not face a formal siege; the action turned on reaching and entering the fort before resistance could be organized. |
| Turning point | The bombardment failed to produce the expected structural collapse, while several ships encountered navigation problems. As damage and casualties accumulated aboard the fleet, the fort remained capable of returning fire. | The decisive moment was penetration of the post itself. Once the small garrison was surprised inside a fort not prepared for a full defense, the contest was effectively settled. |
| Documented OOB records | 6 | 5 |
| Tactical phases | 5 | 5 |
| Command decisions analyzed | 1 | 1 |
| Primary-source records | 1 | 1 |
| Modern/historical geography anchors | 2 | 2 |
Bellum intentionally does not subtract or rank troop/casualty figures when their source scope differs. Open each battle’s evidence table for the exact definitions behind its numbers.